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The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 
 
The Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series is produced by the Jean Monnet Chair of the 
University of Miami, in cooperation with the Miami European Union Center. 
 
These monographic papers address issues relevant to the ongoing European Convention which will 
conclude in the Spring of 2003.  The purpose of this Convention is to submit proposals for a new 
framework and process of restructuring the European Union.  While the European Union has been 
successful in many areas of integration for over fifty years, the European Union must take more 
modern challenges and concerns into consideration in an effort to continue to meet its objectives at 
home and abroad.  The main issues of this Convention are Europe’s role in the international 
community, the concerns of the European citizens, and the impending enlargement process.  In order 
for efficiency and progress to prevail, the institutions and decision-making processes must be 
revamped without jeopardizing the founding principles of this organization.  During the Convention 
proceedings, the Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Papers will attempt to provide not only concrete 
information on current Convention issues but also analyze  various aspects of and actors involved in 
this unprecedented event. 
 
The following is a list of tentative topics for this series: 
 
1.  The challenges of the Convention: the ability to govern a supranational Europe or the return to 
intergovernmental cooperation? 
 
2.  How will the member states figure in the framework of the Convention? 
 
3.  The necessity to maintain a community method in a wider Europe. 
 
4.  Is it possible for the member states to jeopardize the results of the Convention? 
 
5.  The member states against Europe: the pressures on and warnings to the Convention by the 
European capitals. 
 
6.  Is it possible that the Convention will be a failure? The effects on European integration. 
 
7.  Similarities and differences between the European Convention and the Philadelphia Convention of 
1787. 
 
8.  The role of a politically and economically integrated Europe in the governance of the world. 
 
9.  How important is European integration to the United States today? 
 
10.  The failure of a necessary partnership?  Do the United States and the European Union necessarily 
have to understand each other?  Under what conditions? 
 
11.  Is it possible to conceive a strategic partnership between the United States, the European Union 
and Russia? 
 
12.  Russia: a member of the European Union?  Who would be interested in this association? 
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Cultural, Instrumental, Civic and Symbolic Components of National and 
European Identities in Old and New EU Member States
ϕ 
 
 
Introduction  
 
In this article we empirically test three of the most significant theories about the emergence 
of a European identity (as a special case of trans-national or supra-national identity), paying 
special attention to the dimensions of cultural diversity that may conform it. 
  Research into European identity has evolved recently in two quite different directions, 
with very limited contact between the two strands.
1  On the one hand, we find a number of 
theoretical and normative approaches which focus on the definition of the concept of 
European identity, but which have rarely been subjected to empirical testing with attitudinal 
data (Orchard 2002).  On the other hand, there are a number of empirical approaches, mainly 
developed by sociologists and social psychologists, but which, most of the time, lack the 
necessary theoretical and methodological underpinning.
2 The analysis of European identity 
presented in this chapter cuts a middle path between these two dominant approaches to the 
subject. We introduce a number of existing theories about the potential emergence of a 
European identity and test them by using the most appropriate empirical data to answer the 
questions each poses. Our contribution to the field lies not, therefore, in the development of 
new theories or the presentation of unexpected empirical findings, but rather in the way this 
analysis empirically tests existing theories.  Such a test is, of course, necessary if our 
knowledge of European identity is to go beyond the mere “history of a concept and a 
discourse” (Stråth 2002:288). 
 
 
Greatly simplifying existing theories about the emergence of a European identity, we 
have identified three main tendencies in the literature, distinguished by the different possible 
sources of European identification they defend.  The three approaches considered here are:  a 
“cultural” theory, which understands identities as being based on ethno-cultural factors 
generated through a long-term (historical) process; an “instrumental” theory, which conceives 
of identities as being based on self-interested calculation (whether economic or political); and 
“civic” theory, which understands identities as being based on agreement over rules for 
peaceful political co-existence. 
 
A general common preoccupation within these theories is the relation between 
European citizens and national identities.  Similarly, this has not been the object of systematic 
                                                             
ϕ A first draft of this article was presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops held in Edinburgh from 28 
March to 2 April 2003: Workshop 2, “European Culture(s) and European Integration”.  I would like to 
acknowledge the collaboration of Jaroslaw Jósef Górniak, Ankira Kossic, Paszkal Kiss and Maren Kandulla in 
that previous draft. I must thank the participants in that workshop for their helpful insights and observations. A 
reviewed version of that ECPR paper was published in EIoP in July 2004 (http://eiop.or.at/eiop/). The 
anonymous reviewers of that publication greatly contributed to the improvement of this article.  I would like to 
thank specially professor José I. Torreblanca for his valuable comments and criticism. Finally, my gratitude to 
the European Commission V Framework Program for their financial support (EURONAT project, contract no. 
HPSE-CT2001-00044). 
1 See the review of existing studies produced by Geetha Garib and Michael Braum for the European project 
PIONEUR (Working paper 4 – July 2003).  
http://www.obets.ua.es/pioneur/documentos_public.php 
2 For an up-to-date survey and review of the main approaches, see the literature review by Stephen Gibson for 
the project Youth and European Identity.  
http://www.sociology.ed.ac.uk/youth/docs/Gibsons_lit_rev.pdf  
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empirical research. When at the end of the 1980s the European Union launched a number of 
policies aimed at creating a European identity, the member states responded by incorporating 
into the Maastricht Treaty a clause stating that the Union should respect the member states’ 
respective national identities (article F, point 1). This reaction revealed that many member 
states saw the creation of a European identity as a potential threat to their own national 
identities and their citizens’ national loyalties (see Höjelid 2001).   
 
 
More optimistic visions do not conceive European identity as incompatible with 
national identity (Cowles, Caporaso and Risse 2001; Kersbergen 1997).  Some authors 
believe that the increasing globalization of communications and the economy is weakening 
popular interest in national and domestic concerns to the benefit of stronger identification 
with issues beyond national borders (Cerutti 1992). Other analysts conclude that EU 
integration actually strengthens the nation-state, making it more effective and strengthening 
governments’ capacity to tackle global and multidimensional problems which require 
complex coordination, regulatory and enforcement institutions (Millward 1992; Moravcsik 
1998). 
 
Those who remain skeptical about the potential development of a European identity 
reject the notion that citizens can possess more than one identity simultaneously, whereas 
other authors have noted that people can hold multiple identities, each deriving from the same 
source of human attachment (conceptualized as “concentric circles” with different levels of 
intensity), or feel simultaneously attached to multiple identities based on different subjective 
factors of identification. Although little empirical research has been carried out on these 
topics, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that attachments to multiple identities 
draw on different sources. 
 
We have used these debates to select the different items and dimensions to be examined 
in this chapter. We provide empirical information relevant to each of the debates and 
hypotheses, which are then brought together and discussed in more detail in the final section 
of the chapter. Our empirical test of these theories exploits quantitative (Eurobarometer) as 
well as qualitative data (long interviews). 
 
Our results provide only partial support for the theories mentioned above. We find that 
national and European identities are compatible. This is, in part, because while national 
identities are largely “cultural”, European identities are primarily “instrumental”.  However, 
we also find that there is a sufficient European common “cultural” ground for a European 
identity to emerge. In contrast, we find little support for the development of a European 
identity based on “civic” factors. We have also confirmed that, because national and 
European identities are different, the development of a European identity does not necessarily 
imply the transfer of loyalties from the national to the supranational level as suggested by the 
“cultural” and “instrumental” theories.  In all the countries analysed here, attachment to the 
nation remains strong, and certainly greater than attachment to Europe. We also show that it 
is harder for a European identity to develop in countries with a strong sense of national pride. 
 
Theories and Empirical Implications   
 
The group of scholars that we identify with the “cultural” theory argue that if a European 
identity were to emerge, it would not, and should not, be based on the same elements (such as 
a common cultural heritage, language, myths, symbols and emotional bonds) which form the 
foundations of national identities (see Smith 1992, 1995, 1999; Østerud 1999). According to  
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Østerud (1999), a EU identity could be established in two ways. One would emulate 
“classical” nation-building of the type seen during the 19th century, but now developing at 
the European level and including an attempt to construct a stronger European identity. 
However, such a process might be more problematic than in the case of nation-states, due to a 
number of cultural, linguistic, economical and geopolitical factors. Cultural diversity and 
structural differences are deeply rooted in Europe and, as a result, expectations of the 
emergence of a European identity should be regarded as rather utopian. While it may be 
possible for such an identity to emerge, this would certainly take a long time and would 
ultimately lead to the substitution of national identities. 
 
For a second group of scholars, who we have identified as proponents of the 
“instrumental” theory, European identities would be consciously decided on, and are thus 
based on calculated individual self-interests (Brass 1979; Cinnerella 1997). The perception of 
the potential gains or losses that might result from membership of a given social group may 
influence peoples’ identification with it. From this “instrumental” perspective, the better the 
citizen’s evaluation of the results of European policies (compared to the results of policies 
pursued by national governments), the more likely s/he is to feel European. This cost-benefit 
understanding of identities implies that low welfare spending, poor economic performance, 
and low-quality national-level democracy would all make citizens more likely to feel more 
European (Gabel 1998; Eichemberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Palmer 1995; Kaltenthaler 
and Anderson 2001; Olsen 1996; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000; Fernández-Albertos and Sánchez-
Cuenca 2001).
3    
 
Finally, a third line of analysis, which we have labeled the “civic” theory, stresses the 
development of identities around agreement over rules for peaceful political co-existence, 
shared cultural norms, and common beliefs (Mancini 1998:8; Weiler 1999: 346; Kersbergen 
1997).  From this perspective, the substance of EU membership (and European identity) lies 
in a commitment to the shared values of the Union as expressed in its constituent documents, 
a commitment to the duties and rights of a civic society covering specific areas of public life, 
a commitment to membership of a polity which promotes the direct opposite of classic ethno-
nationalism (Weiler, Haltern and Mayer 1995: 23). Drawing on deliberative theories of 
democracy and Habermasian conceptions of communicative rationality, the emergence of a 
European public sphere would be crucial for the emergence of a European identity (Eriksen 
and Fossum 2001).  
 
 
Empirical hypotheses 
  
  1) “Cultural” elements or dimensions do not play a role in the configuration of 
European identities. 
 
  This is a general hypothesis derived from the three theories mentioned above. The 
“cultural” theory explicitly rejects the possibility that a European identity would be based on 
ethno-cultural elements similar to those that gave rise to national identities, such as common 
language, religion, ancestry, customs and traditions etc. The “instrumental” and “civic” 
theories also reject it, implicitly though, giving more relevance to “instrumental” or “civic” 
elements respectively. 
                                                             
3 The authors in this group are more empirically driven than those from the other two schools discussed here. 
Moreover, some of them focus on the variable “support for the European integration”, which is quite different 
from a “European identity”. Nonetheless, these two variables can also be treated as measuring different aspects 
of the same reality: they are, in fact, highly correlated. It is, therefore, reasonable, to assume that any findings 
about the reasons for support for European integration may also tell us something about why people hold a 
European identity.  
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  2) European identities are either “instrumental” or “civic”. 
 
  This hypothesis is complementary to the one above, which is also derived from the 
three theories taken together. This is also a way to say that European identities are rational, 
while national identities would have an “emotional” or irrational component. 
 
  3) Lacking a “cultural” basis, European identity would be weaker than national 
identities (which have a “cultural” dimension). 
 
  This hypothesis is derived from the “cultural” theory. Because “cultural” elements are 
considered the basis for identities, and because there are no ethno-cultural elements common 
to all the European citizens, their European identities will be necessarily weaker than their 
national identities. 
 
  4) National and European identities are exclusive. 
 
  This hypothesis is derived from the “cultural” and “instrumental” theories. Both 
assume a kind of fixed quantity of identity that each individual would split between multiple 
identities, so what is given to one is necessarily subtracted from the other/s (zero-sum game). 
In both theories, the emergence of a European identity would mean a weakening of national 
identities. 
 
This hypothesis can be tested on two levels. First, on an individual level, we may test 
if citizens can be, in fact, attached to national and European identities at the same time; if 
they are more strongly attached to one identity than the other; or if those citizens with weaker 
national identities develop stronger European identities. Second, on an aggregate level, we 
can test if the feeling of strong attachment to the nation is weaker in those countries with the 
higher percentage of dual, or European, identity holders. 
 
  5) National and civic European identities are inclusive 
 
  This hypothesis is derived from the “civic” theory, which states that civic identities 
can be agreed upon by rational citizens without eroding national loyalties or identities, based 
on either ethno-cultural, instrumental or civic considerations. 
 
Data, Definitions and Measurement 
 
This analysis is based on the Standard Eurobarometer 57.2. This Eurobarometer is 
particularly well-suited to test the theoretical debates discussed above.  It contains one battery 
of questions measuring closeness to different in-groups and out-groups (including the nation, 
the EU, Europe and Central and Eastern Europe) and two batteries of questions measuring the 
dimensions held to be most relevant for identification with the nation and Europe.  
 
National samples were taken of the resident population aged 15 or over in each 
country (see table 1).
4  Before proceeding with the analysis, we eliminated non-nationals 
from the country samples. The analysis refers, therefore, exclusively to citizens of the 
countries in question. We applied weighting for the member states and accession countries, 
so each sample totals 1,000 respondents, thereby making the same contribution to the 
                                                             
4 Details about the participants and questions can be found in the Standard Eurobarometer 57.2 codebook  
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/  http://www.nsd.uib.no/cessda/europe.html).  
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aggregate analysis. When carrying out some analyses we also centered the data. Finally, we 
have imputed missing values.  
 
 We use the battery of questions asking about the “closeness to different groups of 
people” to measure identity.  We consider that it has advantages over the indicators used in 
other  Eurobarometers to assess European identity, such as “citizenship”, “support for 
European integration” and “pride in being European”. The question of the relative importance 
of different elements as the source of European and national identification, and whether they 
constitute a single or several dimensions, is a matter of empirical investigation that we will 
analyze in this article. “Closeness” is, therefore, the indicator we will use to measure identity. 
“Citizenship” can be understood as being more closely related to rights and duties (and the 
“civic” theory), and “support for integration” as more closely connected to economic (as well 
as perhaps political) costs and benefits (and the “instrumental” theory). In this sense, 
“closeness” is a more neutral notion. This is not meant to imply that any of the possible 
components of identity mentioned in the previous section are more important than others. 
“Pride”, on the other hand, could be defined as the positive effect that results from feelings of 
identity (not identity itself). 
 
The two batteries of questions measuring the elements perceived as most significant 
for identification with the nation and Europe, include a set of 14 items, each related to 
different components of identity mentioned in the section above. The inclusion of items in the 
questionnaire responded to the following hypothesized groupings. In the case of national 
identities, common culture, customs and traditions, common language, common ancestry and 
common history and destiny are related to the “cultural” conception of identity; common 
rights and duties and  common political and legal systems are linked to the “civic” theory; a 
common system of social security/welfare is associated with the “instrumental” theory about 
identities, as are, probably, national economy, national army and common borders.
5  We have 
also included some other items which, although not manifestly related to any of these three 
theories, could be termed “affective-symbolic” components of identity; these include national 
independence and sovereignty, national pride, national character and national symbols. 
 
We suggest a similar grouping of items with respect to European identity. Common 
civilization, membership of a European society with many languages and cultures, a sense of 
common ancestry and common history and destiny pertain to the “cultural” theory as applied 
to a European identity; an emerging common political and legal system and common rights 
and duties are more closely related to the “civic” conception of European identity; and a 
common system of social protection and the right to freedom of movement and residence are 
linked to the “instrumental” vision of identity, as are, probably, the future European defense 
system, common borders and a single currency.
6 We also included pride in being European, 
in the EU or in a set of European Union symbols as more closely related to an “affective-
symbolic” conception of identities.
7 
                                                             
5 These items could have also a significant affective-symbolic dimension. 
6 These items could also have an important affective-symbolic dimension. Particularly, a single European 
currency may have a strong symbolic value “because a country’s money is a symbol of its sovereignty. Support 
for EMU and the euro, provides, therefore, a crucial test case for whether and why European citizens may be 
willing to transfer power from the nation-state to European institutions, and it has important implications for the 
future direction of institution-building within the European Union” (Kaltenthaler and Anderson 2001: 141). 
7 In these last two batteries of questions the respondent had the option to answer “I do not feel 
national/European”. In these cases, the interviewer did not proceed with the remaining questions in each battery. 
Except in Great Britain, this option was not offered as a prior filter, but only recorded if the respondent 
spontaneously mentioned the idea. This poses a problem for comparative analysis, since we found that as many 
as 62 percent of British respondents did in fact state that they did not feel European. Since we attributed the 
missing values, this could distort the validity of the results for Great Britain. However, in order to test for this 
we ran some of the analyses shown below first with, and then without, input for the British case, and obtained  
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Table 1. National survey samples and number of qualitative interviews 
 
Country  Eurobarometer 57.2 
net sample size 
Qualitative  
interviews 
Germany (East)  1023 
Germany 
(West)  1016  30 
Greece 1002  36 
Spain 1000  24/3 focus 
groups 
Italy 1002  24 
Austria 1018  24 
Great Britain  1038  36 
Czech Republic  1013  24 
Hungary 1027 24 
Poland 1000  33 
Eurobarometer’s fieldwork was carried out between April and June 2002. 
Interviews were given between December 2002 and May 2003 depending on 
the country. 
 
This survey data is clarified, illustrated and complemented with qualitative data from 
long interviews carried out in each country (see Table 1). A minimum of 24 interviews were 
conducted in each of the member states, paying attention to respondents’ gender, age, size of 
habitat, professional profiles and educational level with the aim to maximize the possibility of 
different discourses. We work in this chapter with national reports instead of the original 
interviews, since they were given in nine different languages.
8  
 
  One shortcoming of our analysis is the fact that it is essentially static, while both 
individual and collective identities are in fact dynamic, changing over time. In light of this, 
we have opted to compare and analyze the differences between countries. This kind of 
analysis can be considered dynamic to the extent that it shows differences among countries. 
Nonetheless, the reader should remain aware that the data simply constitutes a snapshot in 
time and depicts identities as being more stable than they really are.
9  
 
Analysis 
 
Let us consider the question of the exclusiveness or inclusiveness of  national and European 
identities in the first place. To that end we have calculated, for each country, the proportion 
of the population expressing simultaneous attachment (closeness) to both the nation and 
Europe, as well as various measures of the strength of their attachments to each of these 
identities.  This data is included in table 2. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
virtually the same results on both occasions. Therefore, even in the British case we opted to attribute the missing 
values, as doing so does not seriously disrupt the analysis. 
8 The qualitative analysis of surveys is based on the EURONAT WP6 national reports produced by Spohn 
(Austria and Germany), Kiss, Somogyi and Pohl (Hungary), Worek (Poland), Ichijo (Great Britain), 
Triandafyllidou (Italy), Kokosalakis (Greece), Voříšek (Czech Republic), Ruiz Jiménez, González Enríquez and 
Biencinto (Spain). These reports, and more information regarding the methodology followed in each report can 
be found in the EURONAT web page:  http://www.iue.it/ RSCAS/Research/EURONAT/Projects.shtml . 
9 This is also a methodological limitation deriving from the techniques and kind of data used to measure 
identities through the administration of a single questionnaire and the temporal concentration of long interviews.  
As social scientists we were confronted by the well-known trade-off between more detailed and sophisticated 
case studies or simplified comparison among countries.    
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Table 2.  Dual Identities and Attachment to the Nation and Europe 
 
 
Percentage of 
population with 
dual identity: 
national and 
European (a) 
Net percentage of 
population with 
dual identities 
(national and 
European) (b) 
Comparative 
attachment to 
national and 
European identities 
(c) 
GERMANY 
WEST  47 -6  .715 
GERMANY 
EAST  45 -10  .792 
AUSTRIA 51  2  .689 
GREAT 
BRITAIN  36 -28  .758 
ITALY 64 28  .669 
SPAIN 61  22  .718 
GREECE 40  -20 1.099 
HUNGARY 54  8  1.043 
POLAND 46  -8  1.012 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC  54 8  .748 
(a) Computed from contingency table.  This is the percentage of those who are very 
close or quite close to their nation and who simultaneously feel very close or quite close to the 
EU. 
(b) Computed from contingency table.  This is the percentage of the population with 
dual identities (they are very close or close both to their nation and the EU) minus the 
percentage of population with only national identity (very close or close to their countries but 
not very, or not at all, close to the EU).  A negative value indicate that most of the population in 
the country hold only national identities.  A positive value indicates that the percentage of those 
with dual identities outnumbers the percentage of population with only national identification. 
 
(c) Independently of the percentage of the population holding only national or dual 
identities, this column measures the relative strength of attachment to both identities.  It is the 
median value of substracting median identification with the EU from median identification with 
the nation.  A positive value indicates that attachment to the nation is stronger than attachment 
to the EU (that is, closeness to the nation is closer). 
 
The first point to be highlighted from this table is that national and European 
identities do not, in fact, seem to be incompatible (that is, exclusive). The percentage of 
respondents expressing dual identities (those who feel close to both their nation and Europe, 
(shown in the first column) is quite high in all the countries. Nonetheless, this figure ranges 
from 36 and 40 percent of the total in Great Britain and Greece, respectively, to 64 and 61 
percent in Italy and Spain. Looking at the same data from a different perspective (subtracting 
the percentage of people with exclusively national identities from the percentage of dual 
identity holders, shown in the second column), exclusively national identities are still held by 
a significant number of citizens of Great Britain and Greece, above all, but are also common 
in Germany (East and West) and Poland. Therefore, from the first two columns in Table 2 we 
could conclude that national and European identities are inclusive, to some extent, in all 
countries (backing, in part, hypothesis number five). Our conclusion from qualitative 
interviews is coincident. Many citizens, in most countries, would acknowledge that they hold 
more than one identity, or different identity levels (local, regional, national, European…). 
Quite interesting, however, from the small number of qualitative interviews in each country, 
we have found some variations pointing in the same direction as the survey data. That is, 
citizens from Great Britain, for example, find it more difficult to combine these two identities  
 
 
10
than citizens in Spain and Italy. Thus, the second column in Table 2, and these qualitative 
interviews, do also pose a question: is the variation in the compatibility between these two 
identities caused by the different importance of “cultural”, “instrumental” and “civic” 
elements of attachment in each country? We will answer this question later. 
 
Before, and equally significant, even in those countries where more citizens have dual 
than exclusively national identities, attachment to national identities is still stronger than 
attachment to European identities (the median value of subtracting median identification with 
the EU from median identification with the nation is always favorable to the nation, shown in 
the third column of Table 2). In other words, there is no correlation between a higher 
proportion of the population with dual identities and a relatively lower attachment to the 
nation. In some countries, qualitative interviews have also shown that citizens express 
stronger feeling of attachment to their nation than Europe, even if acknowledging the 
compatibility of both. This data is informative on the individual level, but we cannot 
conclude anything on the aggregate level, since we have just too few cases. 
 
In terms of our hypotheses, the data in Table 2 would back partially hypothesis 
number three (European identities are weak in comparison to national identities, although we 
cannot yet assure if that would be the consequence of the European identity lacking “cultural” 
foundations) and hypothesis number five (European and national identities are compatible, 
although we cannot yet assure if that would be a  consequence of the European identity being 
based on “civic” elements). However, the evidence in the table would reject hypothesis 
number four, since the emergence of a European identity does not weaken the strong 
attachment to the nation. In fact, stronger attachment to the nation is a feature common to all 
the countries (see that all of the figures in the third column in Table 2 are positive). 
Furthermore, the strength of the bonds to the nation is similar in Great Britain (0.758), where 
exclusive national identities are predominant, and in Spain (0.718), where dual identity 
holders outnumber exclusive national identity holders.  
 
Dimensions/Elements 
  
Having established the apparent compatibility of national and European identities, we should 
ask whether this compatibility is a result of the two identities having different meanings? This 
question is easier to answer with the survey data, but our result might be also more artificial. 
That is, our main findings from qualitative interviews show the difficulties that respondents 
in each country encounter to define what it is to be European. The administration of close-
ended questionnaires in the survey might have artificially eliminated much of these 
ambiguities. However, the data is not contradictory, so it might be possible to obtain a quite 
complete picture using both the survey and the qualitative interviews as complementary data. 
 
A first interesting finding, not captured in the survey, is the fact that European 
identities are contextual.  European identities are always defined in relation to other 
continents or cultures and, especially, in contrast to the United States.
10 This also reflects the 
fact that identities are much more fluid than our survey data would suggest. Citizens do not 
feel European or national one hundred percent of the time, only punctually would one of 
these two identities become salient, depending on the specific context.  
 
Coming back to the survey data, Table 3 lists the five items identified as the most 
important grounds for national and European identification in each country. We have 
included some data from Table 2 which should also be taken into account in this context (net 
percentage of dual identity holders and comparative attachment to national and European 
                                                             
10 Inner identity levels (national, regional, local…) are also contextual.  
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identities). This table makes it possible to begin exploring the dimensions of identification, 
and hence to gain a deeper understanding of the compatibility or otherwise of national and 
European identities.  A first vague impression is that attachment to the nation is largely 
defined in “cultural” terms (language and culture happens to be mentioned among the five 
most important items for national identity in virtually all the countries), while attachment to 
Europe is mainly based on “instrumental” considerations (the common currency – economy 
in the table- and the right of free movement and residence is a recurrent element among the 
five most important items of European identity in virtually all countries). This is even more 
clearly shown in Tables 4 and 5, which are simpler summaries from Table 3 to make it more 
easily understandable. 
 
Table 4 shows the five items that were most frequently mentioned among the five 
most important for national identification (we ranked the items according to their average 
importance and selected the five highest averages in each country).  Some of these items were 
selected in all countries, while others were only relevant for a few or even a single country. 
The table also shows the number of times the item ranked first in the list of items. All 
countries mentioned a common language among the five most important elements for 
national identification, eight mentioned common culture, customs and traditions and common 
ancestry and seven referred to a common history and a common destiny. All the first-placed 
items mentioned correspond to the “cultural” theory of identities. Therefore, we can conclude 
that national identity is largely defined in “cultural” terms. This finding is largely supported 
also by our qualitative interviews. Table 5 provides the same information, but in this case for 
European identities. The right to freedom of movement and residence in any part of the EU 
and a single currency (economy in the table) were mentioned in nine and eight countries 
respectively. Other items such as language and culture or civilization were also identified as 
important. That is, the most frequently mentioned items include those that belong to the 
“instrumental” conception of identity, while others corresponding to the “cultural” theory are 
also mentioned. That the “instrumental” (mainly economic) dimension of European identities 
was also present in qualitative interviews comes as no surprise, but we did not anticipate to 
what extent the “cultural” elements also appeared as relevant, quite spontaneously, without 
being specifically asked for in most cases. We shall develop in a separate section below the 
specific meaning that respondents gave to this “cultural” dimension. It is possible that what 
we consider as “a European identity” has really two dimensions, one (“instrumental”) 
expressed by the respondents as citizens of the EU, and another (“cultural”) one expressed as 
inhabitants of Europe.  
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Table 3.  Most Important Items for National and European Identification 
GERMANY EAST  GERMANY WEST 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe 
Compatibility 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe 
Compatibility 
LANGUAGE MOV./RES.  Net 
inclusiveness  CULTURE MOV./RES.  Net 
inclusiveness 
CULTURE ECONOMY  -10  LANGUAGE  ECONOMY  -6 
ANCESTRY  CIVILIZATIO
N  Comparative RIGHTS  CIVILIZATIO
N  Comparative 
HISTORY LANG./CULT. attachment  ANCESTRY LANG./CULT.  attachment 
RIGHTS  BORDERS ,792 HISTORY  BORDERS ,715 
      
AUSTRIA GREAT  BRITAIN 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe 
Compatibility 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe 
Compatibility 
LANGUAGE MOV./RES.  Net 
inclusiveness  LANGUAGE MOV./RES.  Net 
inclusiveness 
CULTURE  CIVILIZATIO
N  2 BORDERS  LANG./CULT.  -28 
BORDERS LANG./CULT.  Comparative  CULTURE  ECONOMY  Comparative 
RIGHTS BORDERS  attachment  ANCEST./PRI
DE 
CIVILIZATIO
N  attachment 
HISTORY RIGHTS  ,689 SOVEREIGNT
Y  RIGHTS ,758 
      
ITALY SPAIN 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe 
Compatibility 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe 
Compatibility 
LANGUAGE ECONOMY  Net 
inclusiveness  LANGUAGE ECONOMY  Net 
inclusiveness 
CULTURE MOV./RES.  28  CULTURE MOV./RES.  22 
ANCESTRY LANG./CULT. Comparative  BORDERS  LANG./CULT. Comparative 
SYMBOLS ARMY attachment RIGHTS RIGHTS  attachment 
RIGHTS RIGHTS  ,669  CHARACTER  BORDERS  ,718 
      
GREECE POLAND 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe 
Compatibility 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe 
Compatibility 
SYMBOLS MOV./RES.  Net 
inclusiveness  LANGUAGE  CIVILIZATIO
N 
Net 
inclusiveness 
LANGUAGE ECONOMY  -20  SYMBOLS  MOV./RES.  -8 
ANCESTRY BORDERS Comparative  ANCESTRY  LANG./CULT.  Comparative 
PRIDE  SOVEREIGNT
Y  Attachment HISTORY ECONOMY attachment 
HISTORY  ARMY 1,099  BORDERS  ARMY 1,012 
      
HUNGARY CZECH  REPUBLIC 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe 
Compatibility 
Five most 
important for 
nation 
Five most 
important for 
Europe 
Compatibility 
LANGUAGE  CIVILIZATIO
N 
Net 
inclusiveness  LANGUAGE  CIVILIZATIO
N 
Net 
inclusiveness 
CULTURE LANG./CULT.  8  CULTURE LANG./CULT.  8 
HISTORY ECONOMY  Comparative  SYMBOLS MOV./RES.  Comparative 
ANCESTRY HISTORY  Attachment ANCESTRY BORDERS  attachment 
SYMBOLS PRIDE  1,043  HISTORY PRIDE  ,748 
      
Measures of compatibility between national and European identifications are taken from Table 4. 
SOURCE: Standard Eurobarometer 57.2 (2002).  
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Regarding the survey data, our findings partially support hypothesis number two, 
since European identities seem to be based mainly on “instrumental” considerations. 
Nonetheless, the role played by “cultural” elements cannot be considered minor, especially in 
Central and Eastern European member states, where they rank higher than instrumental 
considerations. However, the important finding here, if we take the results shown in Tables 4 
and 5 together, is the varying degrees of emphasis placed on instrumental items. In fact, this 
constitutes the main difference between national- and European-level identities. The evidence 
does not support hypothesis number one, since “cultural” elements also play a role  in the 
configuration of European identities together with “instrumental” considerations.   
 
Table 4. National Identification:  
Items mentioned among the five most important 
Total mention  10: All  LANGUAGE 
Mention in the first place  8: G.E., A, G.B., IT, SP, P, H, CZ 
Total mention  8 : G.E., G.W., A, G.B., IT, SP, H, 
CZ  CULTURE 
Mention in the first place  1: G.W. 
Total mention  8: G.E., G.W., G.B., IT, GR, P, H, 
CZ  ANCESTRY 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  7: G.E., G.W., A, GR, P, H, CZ  HISTORY 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  5: IT, GR, P, H, CZ  SYMBOLS 
Mention in the first place  1: GR 
Total mention  5: G.E., G.W., A, IT, SP,   RIGHTS 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  4: A, G.B., SP, P  BORDERS 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  2: G.B., GR  PRIDE 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  1: G.B.  SOVEREIGNTY 
Mention in the first place  0 
 
 
Table 5. European identification:  
Items mentioned among the five most important 
 
Total mention  9: G.E., G.W., A, G.B., IT, SP, GR, 
P, CZ  MOV./RES. 
Mention in the first place  5: G.E., G.W., A, G.B., GR 
Total mention  9: G.E., G.W., A, G.B., IT, SP, P, H, 
CZ  LANG./CULT. 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  8: G.E., G.W., G.B., IT, SP, GR, P, H  ECONOMY 
Mention in the first place  2: IT, SP 
Total mention  7: G.E., G.W., A,, G.B., P, H, CZ  CIVILIZATION 
Mention in the first place  3: P, H, CZ 
Total mention  6: G.E., G.W., A, SP, GR, CZ  BORDERS 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  3: G.B., IT, SP  RIGHTS 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  3: IT, GR, P  ARMY 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  2: H, CZ  PRIDE 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  1: GR  SOVEREIGNTY 
Mention in the first place  0 
Total mention  1: H  HISTORY 
Mention in the first place  0 
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While this pattern applies in all the countries, we find that the two identities are more 
compatible in some countries than in others. This can be seen in Table 3 and introducing in 
the analysis the information extracted from Table 2. Looking at the net percentage of the 
population with dual identities, we perceive that it varies in different countries, even when 
they share similar sources of national (“cultural” elements) and European identification 
(“instrumental” elements). Take Great Britain and Italy as an example; “cultural” elements 
are important for the national identity of citizens in both countries (both have language and 
culture among the five most important items for national identification), while “instrumental” 
elements are equally important in both countries for the European identity of their citizens 
(common currency and the right of free movement and residence are mentioned among the 
five most important items for European identity), however exclusive national identity holders 
outnumber dual identity holders in Great Britain by 28 points, while in Italy the situation is 
exactly the contrary: dual identity holders outnumber exclusively national identity holders by 
exactly 28 points.  
 
Moreover, Eastern European countries (and Central European countries to a certain 
extent) diverge from the general pattern described here, in that “cultural” (as opposed to 
“instrumental”) considerations are important both for their European and national 
identifications. The cases of Hungary and the Czech Republic, in particular, suggest that even 
if attachments to multiple identities derive from the same “cultural” sources, national and 
European identities may still be compatible. Furthermore, if we take into account that in both 
countries dual identity holders (as measured by the net inclusiveness) outnumber exclusive 
national identity holders by eight points and that the bonds to the nation and Europe (as 
measured by the comparative attachment) still favor the nation, we would conclude that the 
emergence of a European identity based on “cultural” elements similar to those of national 
identity does not endanger or weaken national loyalties (as the “cultural” theory suggests).    
 
What, therefore, makes identities compatible or incompatible? We can rule out 
differences in the relative importance of “cultural” elements of attachment to the nation, an 
explanation suggested by Goldmann and Gilland (2001), since this is a pattern which is more 
or less common to all the countries while the net percentage of dual identity holders varies 
considerably among them. Accordingly, one way of attempting to answer this question is by 
focusing on the countries with the highest and lowest level of compatibility between the two 
types of identities. The countries where identities are least compatible are Great Britain and 
Greece, while the countries in which the two identities are most compatible are Italy and 
Spain. What do each of these two pairs of countries have in common which makes them 
different from the rest?  Great Britain and Greece are the only two countries where pride is 
mentioned among the five most important items for national identification. Great Britain is 
the only country that mentions sovereignty, and where we find the lowest level of 
compatibility between national and European identification (see Table 3). Italy and Spain are 
the only two countries in which rights and duties figure among the five most important items 
for both national and European identification (see Table 3).  This suggests that a strong 
feeling of national pride and attachment to national sovereignty may hinder the development 
of a European identity, but it does not presuppose that the national identity in those countries 
is more “culturally” based. Furthermore, the relation between national pride and European 
identities is not explored in any of the three theories posed above. However, there might be 
some interesting correlations: a recent investigation by Belot (2003) points exactly in the 
same direction regarding the importance of national pride (how it is constructed and the 
elements it lays on) to explain the European identity of young British and French people. 
Finally, our findings in this last part of the section back hypothesis number five, since in 
those countries (Spain and Portugal) that give importance to civic elements both at the  
 
 
15
national and European identity levels, the measure of compatibility is the highest among the 
countries studied. 
 
The Cultural Dimension of European Identities: Deep Historical Roots,  
Rich Cultural Diversity, Christian-humanistic Values 
 
The fact that the countries in Europe have deep, long-lasting historical roots was usually 
brought up in the interviews as one important element in the definition of what it is to be 
European. As we also said, European identities are contextual. In this sense, Europe is 
defined in contrast to the United Status and the “new world” at large (including also Canada 
and Australia), and their short historical records. Only British respondents were less happy 
about the definition of Europe in cultural terms, but those elements were also present. 
According to two recent surveys carried out in one case by the German Marshall Fund and 
the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, and in the other by the Pew Research Center, the 
United States may be, in fact, playing the role of Europe’s significant other, since anti-
Americanism is increasing in Europe.
11 
 
(…) We are more cultured than the Americans are, we have a wider choice of food, a greater 
sense of history, a more socially imbedded approach; and somehow there’s a European ideal that 
Americans are somehow just too money oriented; or insular to understand (Interview 7, Great 
Britain). 
What I feel is a European culture in the sense… of history, this is the thing that I feel [we 
Europeans have] in common (Interview 5, Italy). 
[When I was outside of Hungary in Japan], that is when I felt that I am Hungarian and European. 
Not Japanese, not American, not anything else, however attractive they may be, but… in other 
words, that I am Hungarian and that I love Hungary and Europe (Interview 17, Hungary). 
It is interesting to note, however, that in this contextual definition of Europe, there was 
no mention of “cultural” identities in Asian or African countries with historical records older 
than the Europeans, such as Egypt or China, for example. Even more so, some respondents 
seemed to equate the European culture, with the culture of Western Europe (Great Britain, for 
example). On the other hand, the relative importance given to deep long-lasting historical 
roots, does not imply that the informants understood that all European countries shared only 
one common history or culture. On the contrary, there was a recognition of high levels of 
internal European cultural diversity, but this was positively evaluated (also, again, in contrast 
to the United States). 
 
  Among the elements relevant in this “cultural” dimension, we must mention the 
understanding of Europe as a community of Christian and humanistic values. In this sense, 
Europe was defined mainly against Muslim cultures and countries. In some cases, there was 
not just the existence of a different confession per se, but the negative characteristic ascribed 
to Islam as opposed to the European tradition of freedom, equality and respect for human 
rights. Intolerance, fanaticism and the discrimination against women would not be accepted 
as European defining characteristics.  
 
Religion is one of the basic characteristics of European civilization… let’s not forget that religion 
is a huge part not to say the most basic in the formation of that which we call Europe (Interview 
21, Greece). 
                                                             
11 See The Economist, 4-10 January 2003, pages 10-20. Apparently, it seems that the Czech respondents did not 
put much emphasis on these contrasts between Europe and the United States, although they distinguished North 
American citizens by their consumerism, greed or lack of traditions at times.  
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[In India] when I travelled to the north, there were the Muslims… I don’t know, it was the matter I was a 
woman and there… just rules… the discrimination and… It’s moments that… strike you a bit (…) 
if they kick you off the Mosco just because you’re a woman then… you just aren’t used to this as 
a European, are you? (Interview 22, Czech Republic). 
Finally, it seems plausible that the importance of cultural elements is more related to a 
(European) continental identity than to a EU identity. We cannot test this hypothesis because 
we did not anticipate the possible existence of these two dimensions of a European identity in 
the survey or in the long interviews. However, in some countries, respondents to the long 
interviews seemed to differentiate between both realities.  
 
Europe and the EU are not the same thing, you know? Because Europe is a broader concept. The 
EU, well, somehow, it has more economic connotations, and, if you say “Europe”, I think more of 
the people than in…, well, in some similarities among people, even though they live in different 
countries and all that. (…). Historically Europe consists of more countries than the EU now has 
(…). (Interview 19, Spain). 
The existence of these two dimensions would explain why both “instrumental” and 
“cultural” elements appear as relevant within European identities in our survey. First, we did 
not distinguish between Europe as a continent and the EU; and second, we included cultural 
elements in the list of elements relevant for European identification. However, we cannot be 
sure if respondents answered as citizens of the EU or as inhabitants of Europe. An interesting 
clue, though, is provided by the most recent member states (Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic), which at the time of the survey fieldwork still held the category of accession 
countries. Citizens from these countries, therefore, would have answered about their 
European identities mainly as European inhabitants, since they lacked experience as EU 
citizens. It is interesting to note that it is precisely in these countries where the “cultural” 
elements of European identity are most important. 
  
In summary, our qualitative interview data also show that in most of the countries 
respondents considered “cultural” elements as relevant in the definition of European 
identities: the existence of deep and long-lasting historical roots, cultural diversity  and a 
Christian religion make Europeans different from others. These others are mainly North 
American citizens and citizens from Muslim countries. In this sense, the qualitative 
interviews give us a more dynamic picture of identities. We get the idea that identities 
become salient depending on the context they are discussed or considered. People are not 
aware of their local, national or European identity one hundred percent of the time. Only in 
specific circumstances would they become aware of them. In these cases, citizens see their 
national and European identities as compatible most of the time. 
 
We do not have the time, or the space, here to discuss the possible implications of this 
finding. We shall mention, however, that some scholars fear that a European identity based 
on “cultural” elements may develop into a “racist” and exclusive identity against non-EU 
citizens or non-Europeans. Maybe the parallelism between nation-state formation and the 
emergence of a European identity is present again in that reasoning. We just can say that race, 
as such, did not appear in our interviews, but maybe religion, on the other hand, could 
substitute for it as the basis for such an exclusive identity. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
At the beginning of this article we discussed a number of theories and hypotheses regarding 
the possible sources of European identification and the relation between European and  
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national identities. We will now discuss the plausibility and validity of these hypotheses in 
the light of the empirical data and analysis presented above. 
 
First, and most important, we must reject hypothesis number one regarding the low 
importance of cultural elements for the emergence and development of a European identity. 
The cultural dimension is not absent from the notion of European identity; cultural elements 
are mentioned among the five most important items in most of the countries analysed (in 
Table 5, “language” is mentioned by nine out of ten countries, and a “common European 
civilization” by seven of them). It should be remembered that authors such as Smith (1999) 
and Østerud (1999) hypothesised that it would be extremely difficult for a European identity 
to emerge, given a) the strength of national “cultural” identities and b) the simultaneous lack 
of European “cultural” elements shared by all Europeans. However, not only has a European 
identity emerged in all countries, as measured by the percentage of dual identity holders (in 
Table 2), but in most of them this European identity includes “cultural” elements (among the 
five most relevant), in a similar vein to national identities (Tables 3 and 5).  Hence, on the 
one hand we find that national identities are still stronger and primarily “cultural”; but on the 
other hand we find that “cultural” attachment to a European identity is also relevant (above 
all in Eastern and Central European countries, but also in other members states). So there is 
also much more common “cultural” ground among the European countries on which to build 
up a European identity than this theory would suggest. Our qualitative interviews also 
confirmed the large importance of the “cultural” dimension, and allowed us to specify the 
content or understanding of it. As we said deep and long-lasting historical roots, cultural 
diversity and Cristian-humanistic values are the elements that contribute the most to 
differentiate Europeans from others.  Those others are important in the definition of 
Europeaness, since European identities are contextual (as well as local and national 
identities). North American and Muslim countries’ citizens are the most relevant others 
against who the Europeans define themselves in these cultural terms.  
 
Regarding the second hypothesis, that European identities are either instrumental or 
civic, we have in part disconfirmed it by rejecting also the first hypothesis and having shown 
that European identities bear a cultural dimension. However, we have brought more specific 
information for discussing this hypothesis. Tables 3 and 5 have revealed that European 
identities have also a quite important “instrumental” dimension. In most countries this 
dimension is more important than the “cultural” one (although cultural elements are not 
absent), and much more important than in the configuration of national identities. On the 
other hand, our analysis suggests that we are unlikely to see the emergence of a European 
identity based primarily on civic considerations. According to our data, only in three out of 
nine countries did rights and duties figure among the five most important items for citizens’ 
European identifications (Table 5). 
 
The fact that European identities are based mainly on “instrumental” considerations 
has further important implications. It may favor the possibility of the EU being able to create 
European identities by intensifying the perceived (economic or political) benefits of 
membership. However, it should be noted that in countries which stand out for their strong 
sense of national pride, such as Greece or Great Britain, European identification might 
actually weaken as the perception that the EU is working effectively intensifies. Although 
this hypothesis has yet to be tested, we have found that in these two countries, both of which 
mentioned pride among the five most important components of national identification, 
identities are less compatible even though, as in other countries, instrumental considerations 
were mentioned as grounds for European identification. Accordingly, the perception that the 
EU performs better than the nation-state could be perceived as a threat to citizens’ national 
pride (in order for national pride to remain high, citizens must believe that their own country 
functions better than the EU).   
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Our third hypothesis stated that, lacking cultural basis, European identities would be 
weaker than national identities. We have found some support for this hypothesis. That is, 
attachment to the nation remains stronger than attachment to Europe (Table 2, third column). 
However, European identities are not weaker than national identitie because they lack a 
cultural basis. We observe countries (Hungary and the Czech Republic, in Table 3) that base 
both their national and European identity on cultural elements, in which dual identity holders 
outnumber exclusive national identity holders, and yet the bonds to the nation continue to be 
stronger than bonds to Europe.   
 
The fourth hypothesis spoke about the exclusiveness of national and European 
identities. Our data have shown, however, that it is not true that citizens with weaker national 
identities develop stronger European identities or that in those countries with the higher 
percentage of dual identities, or European identity holders the attachment to the nation is 
weaker than in countries with a higher percentage of exclusive national identity holders. It is 
clear from the data in Table 2 that the bonds to the nation have remained stronger than the 
bonds to Europe even in those countries where the large majority of citizens are dual identity 
holders.  
 
  As regards hypothesis number five, about national and European identities being 
more compatible when European identities are civic, we have already mentioned the minor 
role of civic elements in the configuration of contemporary European identities. Nevertheless 
the cases of Italy and Spain tend to back this hypothesis. That is, those two countries show 
that the coexistence of “civic” elements of attachment both to the nation and Europe favors 
the compatibility of national and European identities (Table 3).  The implication from this 
second finding, is that it might be possible for European identities (dual identities) to spread 
even in those countries with strong national pride, increasing the perception of shared norms 
and values common to all Europeans and particularly common to nationals in each country 
and to Europeans.  
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